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I. Is there an unrestricted right to record police under the First Amendment? 
II. Does the doctrine of qualified immunity protect the police officers’ conduct? 
  
ii 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Petitioner, Huey Lyttle, was the plaintiff before the United States District Court for the 
District of New Normal and the appellant before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourteenth Circuit. 
Respondents, Sydney Cagney and Robert Lacey, were the defendants before the United 
States District Court for the District of New Normal and the appellees before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit. 
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OPINIONS BELOW 
The United States District Court for the District of New Normal’s Opinion and Order 
Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 26–31) is unpublished. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit’s Opinion and Order (R. at 34–36) is 
unpublished. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals issued its opinion and judgment on June 5, 2015. (R. at 34–36). 
Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on July 5, 2015. (R. at 37). This Court granted 
the petition on October 15, 2005. (R. at 38). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 
1254(1) (2012). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
New Normal Statute § 943.03 (2013). 
  
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 On the morning of August 18, 2013, in Thisis, New Normal, criminals broke into the 
homes of several city officials. (R. at 13). The Thisis Police Department (the “ThisisPD”) 
described the suspects as three young men, approximately 20 to 25 years old, one with long 
brown hair and the other two with short blonde hair. (R. at 13). The information related to the 
break-ins and the description of the suspects were confidential. (R. at 13). At approximately 
12:00 p.m., the ThisisPD stationed Sergeant Sydney Cagney (“Sergeant Cagney”) and Officer 
Robert Lacey (“Officer Lacey”) (collectively, the “Officers”) at the corner of Foal Street and 
Pony Island Way to look for the break-in suspects and other criminal activity. (R. at 13).  
At approximately 4:00 p.m., the Officers observed three young men, which fit the 
description of the break-in suspects, riding their bicycles in violation of the New Normal Vehicle 
Code. (R. at 13). The Officers stopped the three young men and identified them as Huey Lyttle 
(“Petitioner”), Dewey Large (“Large”), and Louie Small. (R. at 3). Officer Lacey observed 
Petitioner surreptitiously recording the sensitive encounter on his cell phone. (R. at 3). Due to the 
inherent safety concerns during traffic stops and the confidential nature of the break-in 
investigation, Sergeant Cagney asked Petitioner to stop recording. (R. at 13–14). However, 
despite Petitioner’s apparent compliance, he continued to record the Officers without their 
knowledge. (R. at 3–4, 14). Sergeant Cagney briefly questioned the young men, determined that 
their alibis were legitimate, and issued Large a civil infraction for violating New Normal’s 
Vehicle Code. (R. at 14). After approximately 10 to15 minutes, the Officers released the young 
men. (R. at 16). 
On August 20, 2013, Petitioner uploaded a video of the sensitive encounter to his blog. 
(R. at 4, 13–14). On August 23, 2013, several media outlets mirrored the video from Petitioner’s 
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blog on to their respective websites. (R. at 4). Consequently, on August 25, 2013, Jim Walsh, 
Head of the ThisisPD, directed Sergeant Cagney to obtain a warrant to confiscate any material 
related to the filming, recording, or dissemination of the sensitive encounter in Petitioner’s 
possession. (R. at 14). Sergeant Cagney obtained the warrant as directed and, accompanied by 
Officer Lacey and two other officers, served the warrant on Petitioner. (R. at 4, 14). In 
accordance with the warrant, Officer Lacey arrested and charged Petitioner for violating New 
Normal Statute § 943.03 (App. 2) and the Officers confiscated Petitioner’s hard drive and two 
GoPros. (R. at 4). 
On November 03, 2013, Petitioner filed a complaint with the District Court for the 
District of New Normal. (R. at 2–5). Petitioner alleged that the Officers violated his First 
Amendment right to gather information when the Officers asked him to delete the video of the 
encounter on his cell phone, arrested him for recording and posting the video to his blog, and 
confiscated his GoPros. (R. at 4). On January 22, 2014, the Officers filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing that they did not violate Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to record 
police. (R. at 17–21). On April 25, 2014, the District Court found that Petitioner failed to 
demonstrate that the Officers’ conduct was unreasonable and granted the motion for summary 
judgment. (R. at 26–31). 
On May 09, 2014, Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth 
Circuit. (R. at 32). On June 05, 2015, the Court of Appeals found that Petitioner failed to identify 
a clearly established First Amendment right to record police and held that the Officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity. (R. at 34–36).  
On July 05, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. (R. at 37). This 
Court granted certiorari on October 15, 2015. (R. at 38).  
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
The First Amendment does not provide a right to access, gather, or disseminate 
confidential information related to police investigations. Furthermore, the First Amendment does 
not provide a right to record police as a subject of police action or in an interfering or 
surreptitious manner. Therefore, Petitioner did not have a First Amendment right to record the 
Officers, because Petitioner recorded the Officers while he was a subject of a traffic stop, 
interfered with the traffic stop and the confidential investigation, and recorded the Officers 
surreptitiously after a lawful request to stop. 
Alternatively, an alleged First Amendment right to record police is subject to reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions. Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions may 
negatively affect First Amendment rights provided the restrictions are content-neutral, serve 
significant government interests, and leave open alternate means of expression. When the 
Officers asked Petitioner to delete the video, arrested Petitioner, and seized Petitioner’s GoPros, 
the Officers did not target the message of the video, served significant government interests in 
officer safety and integrity of confidential investigations, and left open alternative forms of 
communication. Consequently, any restrictions imposed by the Officers on Petitioner’s alleged 
First Amendment right to record police were lawful. 
II. 
This Court has consistently held that government officials are entitled to qualified 
immunity unless a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that the defendant violated a particular 
constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. First, 
the Officers did not violate Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to record police, because, 
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either Petitioner did not have a right to record the Officers as a subject of a traffic stop, or in an 
interfering or surreptitious manner, or the Officers lawfully imposed reasonable time, place, or 
manner restrictions on Petitioner’s alleged right. Consequently, Petitioner’s failure to show that 
the Officers violated one of his constitutional rights entitles the Officers to qualified immunity. 
Second, this Court requires that judicial precedent render an alleged First Amendment 
right to record police beyond debate. This Court has not established a First Amendment right to 
record police and the Fourteenth Circuit held that judicial precedent does not clearly establish the 
right. Consequently, an alleged right to record police is not clearly established, because, absent 
this Court’s decision, the Fourteenth Circuit is the only binding authority in this case. 
Alternatively, an alleged right to record police is necessarily debatable as a result of the circuit 
courts’ split. Therefore, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, because Petitioner failed 
to demonstrate that an alleged First Amendment right to record police was clearly established at 
the time of the alleged violation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE AN UNRESTRICTED RIGHT 
TO RECORD POLICE. 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, the 
First Amendment does not provide an unrestricted right to gather information. Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978). This Court declined to recognize a First Amendment right to 
gather information not available to the public. Id. at 9, 11. Furthermore, courts consistently find 
that the First Amendment does not provide a right to record police as a subject of police action or 
in an interfering or surreptitious manner. See, e.g., Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) 
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(finding that a bystander’s qualified right to record police during a traffic stop may not interfere 
with police); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
bystander’s qualified right to record police during demonstrations does not apply to surreptitious 
recording); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a 
passenger subjected to a traffic stop does not have an established First Amendment right to 
record police). 
A. The First Amendment Does Not Provide a Right to Access or Gather 
Information Not Available to the General Public. 
The First Amendment does not provide a right to access all government-controlled 
sources of information or to access information not available to the public. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 
9, 11. Furthermore, Congress explicitly excluded public access to ongoing criminal 
investigations from the Freedom of Information Act. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
552(b)(7), 552(c)(1) (2009). Consequently, the First Amendment does not and should not 
provide a right to gather information on police investigations, because police investigations are 
controlled by the government. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9, 11. Therefore, Petitioner did not 
have a First Amendment right to record the Officers, because the Officers were engaged in 
ThisisPD’s confidential break-in investigation, which was government-controlled and not 
available to the public. (R. at 13–14); see id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
B. The First Amendment Does Not Provide a Right to Record Police to Subjects of 
Traffic Stops. 
Petitioner will argue that courts generally find that the First Amendment provides a 
(restricted) right to record police. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th 
Cir. 2000). However, although some courts find that the First Amendment provides bystanders a 
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restricted right to record police, courts deny the right to subjects of traffic stops. Compare, e.g., 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606 (finding that bystanders had a restricted right to record police), and Glik 
v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that a bystander had a restricted right to 
record police), with Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262 (finding that a passenger subjected to a traffic stop 
did not have a right to record police). Consequently, subjects of traffic stops do not have a First 
Amendment right to record police. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. Therefore, Petitioner did not have a 
right to record the Officers, because the Officers stopped Petitioner and his friends to enforce 
New Normal’s Vehicle Code. (R. at 3); see id.; see also Colten v. Ky., 407 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) 
(finding that bystanders do not have a constitutional right to observe traffic stops). 
C. The First Amendment Does Not Provide a Right to Interfere with Police 
Engaged in Traffic Stops or Investigations. 
This Court recognizes that police officers may enforce traffic laws without interference. 
Colten, 407 U.S. at 109. Courts also recognize that recording police may serve as an intimidation 
tactic that interferes with police business. See, e.g., Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, No. 14-2063, 
2015 WL 9298662, at *7 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2015). Consequently, courts expressly hold that 
recording police may not interfere with police business. See, e.g., Gericke, 753 F.3d at 8; 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. Petitioner interfered with the Officers traffic stop and investigation, 
because Petitioner forced the Officers to immediately address Petitioner when they discovered he 
was surreptitiously recording the sensitive encounter. (R. at 3, 14); see Colten, 407 U.S. at 109; 
Mocek, 2015 WL 9298662, at *7. As a result, Petitioner did not have a First Amendment right to 
record the Officers, because Petitioner interfered with the Officers’ official business. See Colten, 
407 U.S. at 109. 
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The First Amendment does not provide a right to record or release information regarding 
a confidential police investigation, because it may interfere with the investigation or reveal the 
means and methods police use to investigate criminal matters. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7), 
552(c)(1); Baumann v. D.C., 795 F.3d 209, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Furthermore, the Freedom of 
Information Act expressly provides that the public may not access or gather information that 
could (not would) interfere with an ongoing police investigation or provide insight into the 
police’s investigatory means and methods. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Petitioner released a video of a 
sensitive investigational encounter that could have interfered with or revealed the investigatory 
means of methods of ThisisPD’s confidential break-in investigation. See id. Therefore, Petitioner 
did not have a First Amendment right to record or release a video of the Officers investigating a 
confidential criminal matter. (R. at 3–4, 13–14); see id.; Baumann, 795 F.3d at 216. 
D. The First Amendment Does Not Provide a Right to Surreptitiously Record 
Police. 
Some courts that find a restricted First Amendment right to record police explicitly 
distinguish surreptitious recording from open recording. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606–07 
(holding that bystanders had a restricted right to openly record police); Glik, 655 F.3d at 80, 84 
(holding that a bystander had a restricted right to openly record police in plain view from a safe 
distance). Furthermore, some courts that find a restricted First Amendment right to record police 
expressly hold that the right does not apply to surreptitious recording. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 
F.3d at 606 (holding that a bystander’s restricted right to record police does not apply to 
surreptitious recording). Petitioner did not openly record the Officers in plain view; Petitioner 
surreptitiously recorded the Officers with a cell phone application specifically designed to record 
in a discreet manner and with a GoPro inconspicuously attached to his surfboard. (R. at 3–4); see 
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Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. Consequently, Petitioner’s surreptitious actions precluded protection by an 
alleged First Amendment right to record police. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606. 
E. An Alleged First Amendment Right to Record Police is Subject to Reasonable 
Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions. 
Governments may impose reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on protected free 
speech provided the restrictions are content-neutral, serve a significant government interest, and 
leave open alternative methods of speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 
(1989). In accordance with Ward, courts that find a First Amendment right to record police also 
find that the right is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. See, e.g., Alvarez, 
679 F.3d at 605; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333. Sergeant Cagney’s request to delete the video and the 
Officers’ subsequent seizure of Petitioner’s illicit GoPros did not directly target the video’s 
message, served significant government interests in officer safety and investigation integrity, and 
left open alternate methods of communication. (R. at 3–4, 13–14); see Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–
99; see also Gericke, 753 F.3d at 8 (finding that a reasonable order from police may restrict a 
First Amendment right to record traffic stops). Therefore, even though Petitioner will argue that 
he had a First Amendment right to record the Officers, the right is subject to reasonable 
restrictions, which the Officers lawfully imposed. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99. 
i. Police may lawfully impose content-neutral restrictions on First 
Amendment rights. 
The first issue regarding reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions is whether the 
restrictions serve a purpose unrelated to the message of the content. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
Restrictions that incidentally and negatively affect protected free speech are reasonable as long 
as the restrictions are content-neutral. Id. In other words, a government official may restrict free 
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speech for reasons other than simply because a person is recording. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. 
Sergeant Cagney asked Petitioner to stop and delete the video to promote government interests in 
safety and investigation integrity (government interests discussed below). (R. at 3, 13–14); see 
Ariz. v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606. Also, Officer Lacey 
arrested Petitioner and the Officers seized Petitioner’s GoPros in accordance with a warrant, 
which demonstrates that the Officers acted with legitimate reason. (R. at 13–14); see Ward, 491 
U.S. at 791. Consequently, despite any negative incidental effects, the Officers imposed lawful 
content-neutral restrictions on Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to record police, 
because they did not target the content of the video. (R. at 3–4, 13–14); see Ward, 491 U.S. at 
791; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262–63. 
ii. Police may lawfully impose restrictions based on government interests in 
officer safety and investigation integrity on First Amendment rights. 
The second issue regarding time, place, or manner restrictions is whether the restrictions 
serve a significant government interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99. This Court recognizes the 
significant government interest in officer safety. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330. This Court also 
recognizes that traffic stops are inherently dangerous and that the risk of a police officer 
discovering evidence of additional criminal activity increases the apprehension of violence even 
further. Id. at 330–31. The Officers subjected Petitioner and his friends to a traffic stop that, from 
the Officers’ point of view, had a significant propensity towards violence, because Petitioner and 
his friends outnumbered the Officers and matched the description of criminal suspects. (R. at 3–
4, 13–14); see id. Consequently, the inherently dangerous traffic stop created a compelling 
government interest in officer safety and, in pursuit of that interest, validated reasonable 
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restrictions of an alleged right to record the Officers. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330; Ward, 491 
U.S. at 798–99. 
Furthermore, courts that find a First Amendment right to record police often distinguish 
cases involving dangerous situations such as traffic stops. (R. at 3–4); see, e.g., Gericke, 753 
F.3d at 5, 7–8 (distinguishing dangerous traffic stops that involve multiple vehicles and citizens 
and concluding that safety issues may justify restricting First Amendment rights); Glik, 655 F.3d 
at 85 (distinguishing a bystander’s restricted right to record police in a common area from traffic 
stops such as in Kelly). Consequently, the particularly dangerous nature of this traffic stop, i.e., 
Petitioner and his friends matched the description of criminal suspects and outnumbered the 
Officers, reasonably justified the Officers’ unchallenged control to ensure the safety of everyone 
involved, even if those measures incidentally and negatively affected Petitioner’s alleged First 
Amendment right to record police. (R. at 13); see Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330–31; Gericke, 753 
F.3d at 7–8; Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. 
Courts also recognize the significant government interest in maintaining the integrity of 
police investigations. See, e.g., Baumann, 795 F.3d at 216 (finding that a government has a 
significant interest in protecting confidential information that, if released to the public, would 
interfere with a criminal investigation). Consequently, police officers may impose restrictions on 
First Amendment rights to protect the integrity of confidential police investigations. See, e.g., 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606 (finding that police may take all reasonable steps to maintain the 
confidentiality and integrity of investigations). Petitioner potentially compromised the integrity 
of the confidential break-in investigation by posting a video of the sensitive encounter on his 
blog. (R. at 4, 13–14); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7); Baumann, 795 F.3d at 216. Therefore, even 
though Petitioner will argue that the First Amendment provides him a right to record police, the 
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dangerous nature of the traffic stop and the confidential nature of the break-in investigation 
empowered the Officers to impose reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on Petitioner’s 
alleged First Amendment right. (R. at 3–4, 13–14); see Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330; Ward, 491 
U.S. at 791, 798–99; Baumann, 795 F.3d at 216. 
iii. Police may lawfully restrict a particular method of communication as 
long as alternative methods of communications remain open. 
The final issue regarding time, place, or manner restrictions is whether the restrictions 
leave open alternative methods of communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 802. This Court recognizes 
the ease of satisfying this element by simply showing that an alternative method of expression 
was available at the time of the alleged violation. Id. When the Officers asked Petitioner to delete 
the video and subsequently seized Petitioner’s GoPros, the Officers did not restrict every method 
of communication. (R. at 3–4); see id. Instead, the Officers limited one method of 
communication for the purposes of safety and investigation integrity. (R. at 13–14); see Ward, 
491 U.S. at 802; Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. Petitioner could have written or spoken about the 
traffic stop after the Officers released him and disseminated the information accordingly. See 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 802–03. Therefore, the Officers’ lawfully imposed restrictions satisfied the 
three elements developed by this Court in Ward and established that the Officers did not violate 
Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to record police. See id. at 791, 798–99. 
II. PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO SHOW THAT THE OFFICERS VIOLATED A 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT ENTITLES THE 
OFFICERS TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. 
This Court has consistently held that qualified immunity protects government officials in 
discretionary positions from civil liability for reasonable mistakes related to unresolved legal 
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issues. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
638 (1987). Consequently, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless Petitioner 
sufficiently pleads that the Officers violated his alleged First Amendment right to record police 
and that the alleged First Amendment right to record police was clearly established at the time of 
the alleged violation. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40 
(finding that a defendant must violate a particular clearly established right). Failure to 
sufficiently plead both elements will provide the Officers with qualified immunity. See Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). To be clear, this Court expects qualified immunity to 
shield police officers from civil liability for constitutional violations unless the officers were 
plainly incompetent or knowingly violated a plaintiff’s right. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085; 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638. 
A. The Officers Did Not Violate Petitioner’s Alleged First Amendment Right to 
Record Police. 
i. The Officers did not violate Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to 
record police, because the First Amendment does not provide the right. 
The first element of qualified immunity requires that a plaintiff sufficiently plead that the 
defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. The First 
Amendment does not provide Petitioner a right to record police as a subject of police action or in 
an interfering or surreptitious manner. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 109 (holding that police are 
entitled to enforce traffic laws without interference); Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606 (finding that a 
restricted right to record police does not include surreptitious recording); Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262 
(finding that a passenger did not have a right to record police during a traffic stop). As a result, 
Petitioner did not have a First Amendment right to record the Officers, because Petitioner 
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surreptitiously recorded the Officers as a subject of a traffic stop and then interfered with a 
confidential investigation by posting the video online. (R. at 3–4, 13); see Johnson, 555 U.S. at 
331; Colten, 407 U.S. at 109; Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. Therefore, the 
Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, because they did not violate Petitioner’s alleged right 
to record police. See, e.g., Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262–63. 
ii. The Officers lawfully imposed restrictions on Petitioner’s alleged First 
Amendment right to record police. 
An alleged First Amendment right to record police is subject to reasonable time, place, or 
manner restrictions. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333. Reasonable time, place, 
or manner restrictions may negatively affect First Amendment rights as long as the restrictions 
are content-neutral, serve a government interest, and leave open alternative forms of 
communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The Officers lawfully asked Petitioner to stop recording 
the sensitive encounter for safety reasons, asked Petitioner to delete the video to maintain the 
integrity of the confidential break-in investigation, arrested Petitioner for violating New Normal 
Statute § 943.03, and seized Petitioner’s GoPros in accordance with a warrant. (R. at 3–4, 13–
14); see id. Consequently, the Officers did not violate Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right 
to record police, because the Officers imposed restrictions that did not target the specific 
message of the video, served significant government interests in officer safety and investigation 
integrity, and left alternative forms of communication open. (R. at 13–14); see Ward, 491 U.S. at 
791, 798–99, 802. Therefore, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, because Petitioner 
failed to establish that the Officers violated his alleged First Amendment right to record police. 
(R. at 3–4); see al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. 
  
14 
B. An Alleged First Amendment Right to Record Police Is Not Clearly Established. 
The second element of qualified immunity requires that a plaintiff sufficiently plead that 
the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. This 
Court has developed two methods to determine whether a constitutional right is clearly 
established and each method must be independently satisfied to meet the second element of 
qualified immunity. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083–85. First, al-Kidd provides that an 
alleged First Amendment right is clearly established only if judicial precedent renders the right 
beyond debate. Id. at 2083. Second, Pearson provides that an alleged constitutional right is 
clearly established only if all reasonable officers would find that the allegedly wrongful conduct 
violated a protected right. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 
i. A circuit split regarding the clear establishment of a First Amendment 
right to record police necessarily precludes clear establishment. 
It is unjust to hold police officers liable for discretionary actions related to constitutional 
issues when there is a circuit split. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244–45. Furthermore, if this Court has 
not established a particular First Amendment right, then the circuit courts must consistently and 
uniformly recognize the right. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084; but see Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 
2042, 2044–45 (2015) (questioning whether a robust consensus among the Courts of Appeals can 
clearly establish a First Amendment right without this Court’s decision and discussing only 
arguendo that a circuit split can form a clearly established First Amendment right). Neither this 
Court nor the Fourteenth Circuit, which are the only binding authorities in this case, has found a 
clearly established First Amendment right to record police. (R. at 35–36). In fact, the Fourteenth 
Circuit explicitly found that an alleged First Amendment right to record police is not clearly 
established. (R. at 35–36). Consequently, in the context of the circuit courts, an alleged First 
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Amendment right to record police is necessarily debatable. (R. at 34–36); compare, e.g., Glik, 
655 F.3d at 85 (finding an established but qualified right to record police), with Kelly, 622 F.3d 
at 262–63 (finding no clearly established right to record police). Therefore, the Officers are 
entitled to qualified immunity, because a First Amendment right to record police is not clearly 
established. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. 
ii. The Officers imposed lawful and objectively reasonable restrictions on 
Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to record police. 
To determine whether a defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional 
right, courts look at the objective reasonableness of the conduct in question. Anderson, 483 U.S. 
at 639–40. A police officer’s actions violate a clearly established constitutional right only if all 
reasonable officers would find that the actions violated the plaintiff’s particular right. See id. A 
reasonable officer, however, could find that the Officers reasonably asked Petitioner to delete the 
video, because the Officers wanted to maintain officer safety and integrity of the confidential 
break-in investigation. (R. at 13–14); see id. at 638; Ward, 491 U.S. at 802. Furthermore, a 
reasonable officer could find that Officer Lacey reasonably arrested Petitioner and the Officers 
reasonably confiscated Petitioner’s GoPros, because the Officers had a warrant based on 
Petitioner’s violation of New Normal Statute § 943.03. (R. at 14); see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 344–45 (1986) (finding that qualified immunity protects an officer that executes a warrants 
so long as the officer reasonably believes the warrant is valid). Consequently, the Officers are 
entitled qualified immunity, because a reasonable officer could find that the Officers’ conduct 
did not violate Petitioner’s alleged First Amendment right to record police. (R. at 13–14); see 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638–40. 
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C. Petitioner Failed to Allege a Violation of a Particular First Amendment Right. 
Finally, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that the defendant’s conduct was an obvious 
violation of a clearly established and particular constitutional right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
This Court recognizes that allowing a plaintiff to successfully plead a violation of a broad First 
Amendment right to collect information would undermine qualified immunity and ignore the 
interests this Court intends qualified immunity to balance, i.e., protecting constitutional rights 
and enabling police to effectively perform their discretionary duties. See id. at 639. Stated 
differently, this Court requires that a plaintiff sufficiently plead a violation of a particular right as 
opposed to a particular violation of a general right. Id. at 641. Consequently, a plaintiff may not 
successfully sue a defendant by simply alleging a violation of a broad First Amendment right. 
See id. at 639–40; see also al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (warning lower courts against defining 
clearly established rights too generally). Petitioner’s complaint alleges that the Officers violated 
his First Amendment right to gather information when the Officers asked him to delete the video, 
arrested him, and seized his GoPros; however, Petitioner’s complaint fails to specify what 
particular First Amendment right the Officers’ allegedly violated. (R. at 2–4); see al-Kidd, 131 
S. Ct. at 2084. Therefore, Petitioner’s allegation that the Officers violated his general First 
Amendment right to gather information lacks the specificity required by this Court to deny the 
Officers qualified immunity. (R. at 4); see Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 
For the foregoing reasons, Sergeant Cagney and Officer Lacey pray that this Court affirm 
the Fourteenth Circuit’s judgment, which declined to recognize an absolute First Amendment 
right to record police and granted the Officers qualified immunity.  
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Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009) 
§ 552. Public Information; Agency Rules, Opinions, Orders, Records, and Proceedings 
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: 
. . . . 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are: 
. . . . 
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that 
the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right 
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to 
disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or 
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, 
and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement 
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful 
national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential 
source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations 
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the 
law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any 
individual; 
. . . . 
App. 2 
(c) (1) Whenever a request is made which involves access to records described in subsection 
(b)(7)(A) and: 
(A) the investigation or proceeding involves a possible violation of criminal law; and 
(B) there is reason to believe that (i) the subject of the investigation or proceeding is not 
aware of its pendency, and (ii) disclosure of the existence of the records could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, 
the agency may, during only such time as that circumstance continues, treat the records as 
not subject to the requirements of this section. 
. . . . 
. . . . 
New Normal Statute § 943.03 (2013) 
§ 934.03. Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications 
Prohibited 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who:  
(a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept 
or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication;  
(b) Intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to 
use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication 
when:  
1. Such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or 
other like connection used in wire communication; or  
2. Such device transmits communications by radio or interferes with the transmission of 
such communication;  
App. 3 
(c) Intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the 
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication in violation of this subsection;  
(d) Intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained 
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this 
subsection; or  
(e) Intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted by means authorized by subparagraph 
(2)(a)2., paragraph (2)(b), paragraph (2)(c), § 934.07, or § 934.09 when that person 
knows or has reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception 
of such a communication in connection with a criminal investigation, has obtained or 
received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, and intends to 
improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation;  
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4).  
. . . .  
(4) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), whoever violates subsection (1) is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, § 775.084, or § 
934.41.  
(b) If the offense is a first offense under paragraph (a) and is not for any tortious or illegal 
purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial 
gain, and the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the offense under 
App. 4 
paragraph (a) was committed is a radio communication that is not scrambled, encrypted, 
or transmitted using modulation techniques the essential parameters of which have been 
withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such 
communication, then:  
1. If the communication is not the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a 
cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone 
handset and the base unit, a public land mobile radio service communication, or a 
paging service communication, and the conduct is not that described in subparagraph 
(2)(h)7., the person committing the offense is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first 
degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.  
2. If the communication is the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a 
cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone 
handset and the base unit, a public land mobile radio service communication, or a 
paging service communication, the person committing the offense is guilty of a 
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